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IN THE

Supreme Court
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE K. THOl\IPSON and
FRANK S. l\IARKHAl\1, co-partnership doing business under the
firm name and style of THOMPSON-MARKHAl\1 COl\IP ANY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL CO~IMISSION
OF UTAH, WILLIAM l\L KNERR,
Chairman and member of said The
Industrial Commission of Utah, and
0. F. McSHANE and FRANK A.
JUGLER, members of said The Industrial Commission of Utah, and
E. A. HODGES, State Metal Mine
Inspector,
Defendants.

No. 622 J

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In discussing this matter we shall refer to the plaintiffs as the Contractors, and to the defendants as the
Commission.
The Contractors have an agreement with the U. S.
1
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Government to drive a tunnel through a mountain located
about twenty miles south of Salt Lake City. When completed, this tunnel will be approximately three miles long,
and will be used to convey irrigation waters from the
Provo River to the Salt Lake valley. This controversy
was brought on because of the fact that the Contractors
insist on keeping their employees under ground more than
eight hours. The Commission advised them that this was
contrary to law, and threatened to take legal proceedings
unless they desisted. The Contractors then made application to this court, and secured a temporary Writ of
Prohibition. The Commission filed a general Demurrer
and also an Answer to the Petition, all of which are set
out in the Contractors' Brief which has been filed with
this Court.
The law which the Commission claims the Contractors have violated is Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937,
and which, insofar as material here, reads as follows:
''The period of employment of working men
in all underground mines or workings shall be
not more than eight hours per day, such eight
hour period shall be computed from the time men
go under ground until they return to the surface,
except in cases of emergency where life or property is in imminent danger; provided, however,
when under ground hoists or pumps are in continuous operation, hoistmen and pumpmen employed
on such hoists or pumps may be permitted to be
underground not to exceed eight hours and thirty
minutes. Any employer who violates any of the
provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.''
2
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The law relating to this subject was first enacted by
the Legislature of 1896, shortly after the adoption of our
State Constitution. Section 6 of Article XYI of the Constitution provides:
''The Legislature shall pass laws to provide
for the health and safety of employees in factories,
smelters and mines.''
In their brief the Contractors contend that the eight
hour law passed in 1896 was to carry out the mandate of
the constitutional provision above quoted. Undoubtedly,
this constitutional provision caused the initiation of the
legislation, but the legislaion of 1896 apparently restricted and enlarged upon the constitutional mandate. For
instance, the Constitution directed that the legislation
should provide for the health and safety of employes in
"mines." The legislation was restricted to "underground
mines.'' The constitutional provision was enlarged upon
by extending the legislation to underground mines or
underground workings.
In their brief the Contractors trace the history of this
legislation back to its origin for the purpose of showing
that it was the intention from the beginning that the law
should apply only to mines and not to other underground
workings. They refer to the titles of the various acts in
the various compilations as'' A DAY'S WORK-MINES
AND SMELTERS.'' A reference to these acts, however,
will reveal that "mines and smelters" was not the title of
the act, but was inserted in the law either by the engross3
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ing clerks or by the printer. The title of the act under
consideration reads as follows:
''AN ACT Al\iENDING SECTION 49-3-2,
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH, 1933, RELATING TO THE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT OF WORKING MEN IN UNDERGROUND MINES OR WORKINGS, AND IN
SMELTERS AND IN ALL OTHER INSTITUTIONS FOR THE REDUCTION OR REFINING
OF ORES OR METALS, PROVIDING THAT
THE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT FOR UNDERGROUND 1\iiNES OR WORKINGS SHALL
BE EIGHT HOURS PER DAY."
The principal question to be solved in this matter is
what did the Legislature intend by the use of the words
"or works."
We all agree that the Legislature intended "or underground works.'' The Contractors say that the intention was that the ''underground works'' was intended to
mean the underground works in connection with an underground mine. We say that the Legislature, by the use
of the words ''or underground works,'' referred to similar underground works other than those found in mines.
If the Legislature intended that this act should apply to
mines only, then there was no occasion for inserting in
the act ''or underground works.'' If they had used the
words ''The period of employment of working men in all
underground mines shall be not more than eight hours
per day,'' no one would contend that it did not apply to
every man working under ground in every mine. The
word ''mine'' includes every tunnel, shaft, raise, drift,
4
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and eYery other portion of the n1ine. One is just as much
a part of the mine as the other, so that the legislators
had something in mind when they inserted the words "or
underground works". They realized that in this mountainous country many tunnels are being driven which
do not have for their object the development of a mine.
\Ye refer, for instance to railroad tunnels, water tunnels,
transportation tunnels. They knew that the same methods
were used in the driving of these tunnels as are used in
the driving of tunnels in search of minerals, and they
knew that they were driven by miners, and that one was
just as injurious to the health of these miners as the
other. The statute should, therefore, be construed as
though it read: ''The period of employment of working
men in all underground mines or other ground workings
of a similar character shall be not more than eight hours
per day."
The Contractors refer to the cases of the State of
Utah vs. Holden, 14 Utah 71, and State vs. Holden, 14
Utah 96, and they claim that this court by these decisions
has determined that the law under consideration refers
only to mines.
In one of these cases an employer was convicted of
working his employee more than eight hours per day in a
mine, and in the other more than eight hours per day in a
smelter. The court had under consideration the sole question as to whether or not the Legislature may limit the
hours of employment in underground mines and smelters.
In both cases it was definitely decided that the Legisla-

5
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ture had such right, and that the act was a valid exercise
of legislative authority. There was no question as to
whether or not the act applied to underground works
other than mines, and this court, in either case, did not
mention the subject. True, in the course of the long
opinions, statements were made to the effect that the act
applied to employees in mines. It is such statements as
these that the Contractors have selected from these decisions and cite them as holding that this court had already
determined the issues involved in this action.
These cases were appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States and upheld by that court in re: Holden
vs. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. As stated above, all of these
decisions hold that the Legislature may lawfully regulate
the hours of labor, but they do not mention or even intimate what their ruling would be on the questions involved
in the instant case.
Notwithstanding the fact that Utah and some of the
other states have acts similar to the one under consideration, I have been unable to find any case deciding the
point raised in these proceedings. Numerous tunnels have
been driven in the mountains for purposes other than
mining, and yet the question is raised in this court for
the first time. It is reasonable to suppose that the persons
who made these tunnels felt that they were amenable to
the eigh hour law and complied with the same, otherwise
it would seem that the matter, long ago, would have been
brought before the courts.
We submit, therefore, that the Utah cases above cited,
6
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are authority only to the effect that the Legislature may
enact laws of this kind. The saine is true of the case of
Short vs. :Jiining Co., 20 Utah 20, cited by the Contractors.
The question under consideration in this matter was not
before the court nor considered by the court.
In their brief the Contractors next contend that this
eight hour law is a penal statute, and being such it must
be strictly construed. Then they cite cases from other
courts which hold that penal statutes must be strictly
construed.
In answer to this contention, however, we refer the
court to Section 103-1-2 of the penal code of our Revised
Statutes, which reads as follows:
"The rule of the common law that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to these revised statutes. The provisions of
these revised statutes are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view
to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.''
This appears to be a complete answer to the theory
advanced by the Contractors that penal statutes must be
strictly construed.
The Contractors next refer to the Missouri case of
State vs. Cantwell, 78 S. W. 569. In this case the court
was construing an eight hour law which definitely provided that it should relate only to tunnels, etc., being driven
for the purpose of developing minerals. The defendant,
as one of his defenses, claimed that it was an unlawful
classification in that it protected miners in driving tun-

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nels for mineral purposes, but did not protect miners who
drive tunnels for other purposes.
To get around this objection the Supreme Court of
Missouri said that railroad tunnels, water tunnels, etc.,
are only of temporary duration, while tunnels being driven to encounter mineral are permanent in their nature,
and hence there was no unlawful classification.
The Supreme Court of Missouri and the Contractors
overlook a vital point. They forget that all of these tunnels, mines, etc., are driven by men who make their livelihood by working beneath the surface of the earth; that
when they complete one job, they go to another of the
same or a similar kind. These tunnels are not constructed,
for instance, by a group of farmers who go back to the
farm when the work is completed. There is no reason why
a miner in a water tunnel should not receive the same protection as a miner working in any other kind of tunnel.
The Legislature of Missouri in the enactment of this
act must have felt that it would be construed to include
all classes of tunnels unless it prescribed that it should
apply only to tunnels being driven for mineral purposes,
and hence it made the classification above mentioned.
The Missouri case, however, is definite authority to the
effect that the Legislature may limit the hours of employment in underground mines.
The Contractors also refer in their brief to a California case and a Wyoming case, but we cannot see that
either of these cases has any bearing whatever on the
question under consideration.

8
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The Contractors next contend that if it should be decreed that the tunnel which they are driving comes within
the purview of the eight hour law, then such law is unconstitutional for the reason that the Legislature is without
power to limit the hours of labor in such a tunnel. They
cite the various sections of our State Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States relating to due process,
the right to contract, etc., and they attempt to show there
is no necessity for granting protection to miners engaged
in the driving of such a tunnel, and they say that the Legislature in the enactment of the law did not make a finding
to the effect that such labor is injurious to health of such
Inlners.
This same objection has been raised in nearly every
case where the subject has been under consideration. It
has been repudiated by this court in the Holden case,
supra, and in the recent case of McGrew, et al, vs. Industrial Con1., 96 Utah 203. It has also been repudiated in a
recent decision by the Supreme Court of the U. S. in re:
West Coast Hotel Co., vs. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, wherein
Chief Justice Hughes used the following words:
''Times without number we have said that the
legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity
of such an enactment, that every possible presumption is in favor of its validity, and that though the
court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not be annulled unless
palpably in excess of legislative power.''
And then again on page 399 of the Parrish case, the court
says:
''The adoption of similar requirements by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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many States evidences a deepseated conviction
both as to the presence of the evil and as to the
means adapted to check it. Legislative response
to that conviction cannot be regarded as arbitrary
or capricious, and that is all we have to decide.
Even if the wisdom of teh policy be regarded as
debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment."
This court in the case of State vs. Packer, 297 Pac.
1013, used the following language :
''Where an act has a real and substantial relation to the police power, then no matter how unreasonable nor how unwise the measure itself may
be, it is not for the judicial tribunals to avoid or
vacate it upon constitutional grounds, nor will the
courts assume to determine whether the measures
are wise, or the best that might have been adopted;
or whether such laws are invalid on the ground of
inexpediency, or whether they bear any real or
substantial relation to the public welfare.''
And again this court in the case of Ashton-Jenkins Co.
vs. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, used the following words:
''Besides this, since when did the courts of
this country become possessed of the power to determine the necessity of a statute or want of necessity in any particular case, and make that the
controlling factor in determining whether or not
the statute was unconstitutional~ Such power does
not belong to the courts. It is forbidden ground,
upon which they dare not tread. The proposition
is elementary."
This Court in the recent case of McGrew vs. Industrial Com., 96 Utah 203, 85 Pac. 2nd 608, had under consideration the question of the right of the Legislature to

10
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fix a minin1um wage for women and miners. In upholding
that right the court said:
"That the State rnay impose limitations and
regulations on the right to contract has never been
questioned but the question as to how far the
State may go has been raised often. Many laws
restricting this right have been upheld. The one
most commonly called to mind is the Usury Law
which prohibits contracts by which a man may receive more than a specified rate of interest for the
money he lends. ~Iany Sunday laws prohibit all
contracts made on Sunday, one seventh of our natural life. Insurance rates and policy terms are
regulated. Telephone charges, railroad rates,
power, light, and gas rates are not only controlled
and limited but prescribed and fixed by law.''
The Contractors lay great stress on the case of In re
Morgan (Col.), 58 Pac. 1071, wherein the Colorado Supreme Court held a law unconstitutional which prescribed
that eight hours should constitute a days labor in mines
and smelters. This decision seems to stand alone.
We call the court's attention to 16 R. C. L. at page
487, wherein the author refers to the Colorado case above
mentioned, and says :
"In a number of states wherein mining is
carried on extensively there are statutes prohibiting the employment of workmen for more than
eight hours per day in underground mines or workings or smelters or in institutions for the reduction
or refining of ores or metals, except in cases of
emergency where life or property is in imminent
danger. Apparently but a single court has declared such a statute to be invalid, because the
court entertained the extreme view that in a pri-

11
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vate business attended with no injury to the public
the legislature cannot prohibit an adult male from
working more than eight hours per day on the
ground that longer hours may or pr()bably will
injure his own health. As might have been expected, the effect of this decision was promptly
obviated by a constitutional amendment directing
the legislature to provide for an eight hour day in
mines or underground workings, blast furnaces,
smelters and ore reduction works, or other branches of industry or labor, that the legislature may
consider injurious or dangerous to health, life or
limb. Moreover, independently of express constitutional authority, the validity of statutes containing identical or similar provisions has been upheld
by the federal supreme court and by all the state
courts which had occasion to pass thereon.''
The Contractors say that if the legislative act under
consideration applies to the driving of a fifteen thousand
foot tunnel, then it would apply to excavations for a house,
a well, or a sewer trench. We are only concerned in this
matter as to whether or not it applies to the tunnel in
question, but we feel that it is no more applicable to the
excavation for a house, or open sewer, or an ordinary well,
any more than it would apply to an open-cut in a quarry,
or the large open-cuts being made by the Utah Copper
Company.
It is fundamental law that legislative acts are
construed in accordance with the intention of the legislators. The courts often supply words in order to express
the legislative intent, or they may strike out words in
order to arrive at the legislative intent. In the case of
Dunn vs. Bryan, 77 Utah 604, this court quotes with approval the following:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"It is a cardinal rule of construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded
to eYery section, dause, word or part of the act."
••The seYeral provisions of the statute should
be construed together in the light of the general
purpose and object of the act and so as to give effect to the n1ain intent and purpose of the legislature as therein expressed.''
"An interpretation which defeats any of the
manifest purposes of the statute cannot be accepted.''
We call the courts' attention to the following words
in 25 R. C. L. page 967 :
''It often happens that the true intention of
the lawmaking body, though obvious, is not expressed by the language employed in a statute
when that language is given its literal meaning. In
such cases, the carrying out of the legislative intention, which, as we have seen, is the prime and
sole object of all rules of construction, can only _be
accomplished by departue from the literal interpretation of the language employed.''
And again on page 966 the following language is used:
"The application of the general rule that the
intention of the legislature is to be determined
from the language of the statute is not affected by
the fact that the phraseology may be awkward,
slovenly or inartifcial. Language which has a distinct meaning, however awkward and inept, must
be held to express the legislative will, and the facility with which the legislature might have expressed itself more appropriately or more directly
will not authorize a court to disregard the natural
sense of the words actually used.''
As stated above, the Legislative did not need to use

13
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the words ''or underground works'' in order to reach
every employee working under ground in every mine of
the state. We must assume, therefore, that in the use of
such words the law makers decided to go beyond what are
ordinarily considered as mines. This court will take judicial notice that only a very small percent of the numerous tunnels, shafts, etc., ever develop into a mine. They
are referred to by mining men as ''prospects.''
The court will take judicial notice that we have in
this State numerous long tunnels which were driven for
the sole purpose of conveying water in order to drain the
properties which are being worked for mining purposes.
We call your attention in particular to the Ontario drain
tunnel, the Snake Creek drain tunnel, the Tintic drain
tunnel, and the long drain tunnel now being driven by the
International Smelting Company near Tooele, and which
is known as the Elton Tunnel. Some of these tunnels are
more than three miles long, and never encountered a hatful of ore. The Legislature knew of such tunnels, and
knew that they were constructed by miners, and knew that
the same methods were used in constructing them as are
used in the construction of tunnels driven for the purpose
of encountering commercial ores. Suppose, for instance,
that in the driving of the instant tunnel, conditions seemed to justify an ore depo~it about midway in the tunnel,
and supposing that the owner of the ground decided to
explore these conditions with the hopes of getting commercial ore. He would undoubtedly drive another tunnel
through the same formations that the instant tunnel is

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

being driven. He would use the same methods for breaking the rock and bringing it to the surface. He would use
miners experienced in underground mining. He may never
encounter any ore or valuable mineral, and yet under
the interpretation contended for by the Contractors, his
men would be protected by the eight hour law, but the
miners driving the water tunnel through the same formation under the same circumstances would receive no such
protection.
The purpose of this legislation was to protect those
workmen of the State who toil beneath the earth where
the sunlight never strikes, and where the air is damp and
polluted with powder smoke and other gases. We cannot
believe that the Legislature intended this act to apply
only where the underground work was being pursued for
the purpose of encountering commercial ore.
The diseases which these underground miners most
usually contact are miners consumption or silicosis. The
court, we believe, will take judicial notice that these diseases are brought on by breathing fine, sharp particles
of dust which cut and injure the lungs. These sharp particles of rock are caused by the drills and picks striking
the hard rocks. The powder smoke, the damp air, and
the sharp dust particles are present in all tunnels where
picks, drills, and dynamite are used. It makes no difference whether the tunnel is being driven for the purpose
of finding ore, or for the purpose of conveying water.
They are all driven alike, and the same conditions exist
in all.

15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

These matters were known to the legislators, and it
was for this reason that they used the words "or underground works", so that they could protect underground
miners throughout the State. Any other construction of
the act is too narrow and will work to the injury of a large
numbe-r of workmen underground whom the Legislature
intended should receive protection.
Most respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General,

S. D. HUFFAKER,
Deputy Attorney General,
Attorneys for Defendants.
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